The confluence of nanotechnology and biotechnology provides significant commercial opportunities. By identifying, classifying and tracking firms with capabilities in both biotechnology and nanotechnology over time, we analyze the emergence and evolution of the global nanobiotechnology industry.
Our analysis shows that nanobiotechnology capabilities first emerged in multinational corporations in the 1980s and early 1990s ( Fig. 1 ). Most of these multinational corporations are based in the chemical (Dow, Bayer, for example), pharmaceutical (Roche, Abbott Labs, for example) or the electronics (HP, Hitachi, for example) industries. Most have developed capabilities in biotechnology and nanotechnology in separate subsidiaries and have supplemented their capabilities by acquiring smaller nanobiotechnology firms. By 1990, there were already 10 multinational corporations with both biotechnology and nanotechnology capabilities ( Fig. 1 ). (In fact, research areas such as liposomes, which are now considered to be within the realm of nanotechnology, have existed in polymer chemistry research since the 1960s.) Specific nanobiotechnology applications began to emerge in the early 1990s.
As of 1999, the majority of the firms in the emerging nanobiotechnology sector were de novo firms, which we define as new ventures founded specifically to commercialize the opportunities arising from the confluence of biotechnology and nanotechnology. De novo firms rapidly increased in number between 1995 and 2007 ( Fig. 1) , with a total of 215 entries during that time period. The timing of these entries is consistent with the claim that new ventures are more likely than large, established firms to attempt to commercialize highly uncertain technologies 4, 11, 12 . In the emerging nanobiotechnology industry, approximately two-thirds of the firms with nanobiotechnology capabilities are very small as measured by annual revenues 4, 13 . Therefore, ventures can be considered the primary driver for innovation in such highly diverse fields. One prominent nanobiotechnology inventor and entrepreneur stated that he needed to form new ventures because when he licensed his diverse technologies to large firms they often did not develop these technologies further 12 . A de novo example is depicted in Box 1. Our data also showed a steep decline in the number of de novo entrants during and after 2008 and an increase in the number of de novo exits in the same period. It is likely that this reflects financing constraints during the period 15 .
We define de alio as incumbent firms that have chosen to enter the nanobiotechnology industry.
De alio firms are differentiated from multinational corporations because they are smaller in size, have fewer (or no) subsidiaries, and have much less geographic scope. De alio firms are often established biotechnology firms, which enter the nanobiotechnology industry through development of their own capabilities in nanotechnology or by acquiring existing firms that have demonstrated success in integrating biotechnology and nanotechnology. We find that the de alio firms started entering this industry in increasing numbers after 1998following the FDA approval of the first nanobiotechnology drug Doxil® in 1995with a peak in the year 2005.
After a period of fewer entries after 2008, another increase was observed in 2011 ( Fig. 1 ).
Although multinational corporations have significant nanotechnology capabilities, we find that their focus remains on their existing industries and technologies: only a very small proportion of their total patents can be classified as nanobiotechnology (on average 0.1%, compared with an average of 9.9% for de novo firms and 3.0% for de alio firms). This highlights the tensions between existing capabilities and emerging capabilities within large, established organizations, such as the pressures suppressing radical innovation in the multinational chemicals corporation Degussa 11 . Therefore, despite first-mover advantages and superior resources of multinational corporations, it is the small, fledgling experiments, in the form of de novo firms tightly integrated to universities, which appear most likely to cross-pollinate concepts from different disciplines and commercialize the resulting nanobiotechnology inventions.
Industry evolution across countries and regions
Based on existing innovation literature 16 , we expected national and regional differences in the evolution of the global nanobiotechnology industry. Similar to other technology based industries, the evolution of the nanobiotechnology industry globally has not been homogeneous. As depicted in Fig. 2 , we find that the US leads the emergence of this industry, with approximately 60% of global firms located there. Predominant regional strengths in nanobiotechnology are found in California, Massachusetts, and New York & New Jersey. Somewhat surprisingly, the rest of the US also has a substantial and growing proportion of nanobiotechnology firms, outside of traditional biotech clusters. For example, the integrative nanobiotechnology diagnostics venture, Nanosphere (see Box 1), was spun out of Northwestern University and is building its Overall, it can be seen that the global nanobiotechnology industry underwent rapid growth before 2008 (a 51% increase in the total number of firms between 2005 and 2008), but slowed down substantially after 2008 (a 17% increase in the total number of firms between 2008 and 2011). Regions have evolved in notably different ways. Massachusetts firms, for example, represent all subsectors of nanobiotechnology and have a roughly equal mix of de alio and de novo firms. France, on the other hand, has fostered impressive growth in a focused nanobiotechnology subsector, suggesting that purposeful science policy can play an important role in this emerging industry.
Industry evolution by subsector
The nanobiotechnology industry consists of several subsectors with notable differences in application focus. Table 2 provides an example of the types of firms that are categorized in each nanobiotechnology industry subsector. Following studies of industry evolution that track firm entry and exit over time 18 , Figure 3 Figure 3 . Consistent with this interpretation, we note higher consolidation (i.e. firm exits) in this industry subsector.
Scientists and engineers in these firms should therefore be more focused on process attributes, such as reducing cost and increasing reliability, and less focused on developing new product features or technological attributes.
The drug delivery subsector appears to be toward the end of the fluid phase of industry emergence. In this phase, there are still opportunities for radical innovation, and the focus is on competing on product features or technical attributes. That said, the rate of entry has reduced in this subsector, and potential dominant designs are emerging among drug delivery technologies 19, 20 . Our data on the degree of integration of nanobiotechnology knowledge in biopharmaceutical firms suggests that they may only adopt a dominant design from the drug delivery firms, rather than contribute to forming it. Biopharmaceutical firms are likely to focus more on the new drug and less on the delivery mechanism, choosing to adopt and, where necessary, adapt mechanisms developed by drug delivery specialist firms. Doxil® is a good example of the delivery mechanism being developed by a specialist nanobiotechnology drug delivery venture 8 .
Conclusions
Although the first firms to develop capabilities in both biotechnology and nanotechnology were multinational corporations, these capabilities often remained in 'silos' and were overshadowed by the multinational corporations' existing capabilities. De novo firm entry intensified after 1995 and appears to be the primary driver for innovation in such highly diverse fields. The US remains the dominant location for nanobiotechnology commercialization, with Germany a distant second. In terms of industry subsectors, the drug delivery sub-sector appears to be coalescing around potential dominant designs, but still competes on technological attributes: as such, the focus is still on product innovation, and establishing a dominant design. In the suppliers & instrumentation subsector, the period of rapid entry appears to have concluded, suggesting that these firms should be focussing on process innovation and subsequent cost reduction.
We argue that knowledge-based sectors drawing on a diverse range of novel inputs, such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, will be most likely to provide opportunities for radical innovation and economic growth. Integration of such disparate technological fields is not straightforward, however, especially for multinational corporations. Firms can increase their chances at benefiting from emerging industries such as nanobiotechnology by enhancing the exchange of ideas across technology fields and knowledge workers. Co-location of diverse groups, purposeful mixing of disparate expertise and insulation from an incremental innovation culture are recommended 8, 11, 21 . Hiring of scientists and engineers with an interdisciplinary education could also help bridge technology 'silos' 8, 22 . Such practices would accelerate the transition of the significant promise of nanobiotechnology into economic and social value.
Governments can also influence innovation in industry by providing resources and by creating an environment encouraging innovation. Measures that have been proven most effective are government funding of research, ensuring a broad and strong system of education, and ensuring a robust and resilient infrastructure 23 . We have observed in our data here and in other studies that new entrants in emerging industries tend to be clustered in a few locations that might be said to have a strong and balanced ecology of research centers, talented human resources, excellent transportation, communication and other assets supporting innovation 24 .
The increasing entry of firms outside of traditional biotechnology clusters, however, suggests that science policy can play an active role in this emerging industry, with star scientists at research universities seeding new clusters. 
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We created three distinct samples ( when proof was found that they still had relevant capabilities.
Next, we verified the existence and timing of development of both sets of capabilities through web searches, press releases, publications, and US patents. Nanotechnology patents were identified using keywords adapted from recent studies 1,2 and biotechnology patents were identified using standard guidelines based on patent sub-classes 3 . Using the patent filing date from the first of the selected patents (assigned to the company or its relevant subsidiaries) and
comparing with the founding year of the firm, we were able to classify firms as de novo if the difference between the founding year and year of acquisition of nanotechnology capability was 3 years or less. Firms with more than 3 years difference between founding and year of acquisition of nanotechnology capabilities were identified as de alio or incumbent firms. In cases where firms had not yet had patents assigned to them, press releases, company documents, scientific publications and industry reports were used to identify the initial year of development of nanotechnology capabilities. These additional data sources allowed us to retrospectively supplement each cohort if these sources indicated such capability development prior to their date of entry in the three databases used. This retrospective analysis thus enables our sample to comprehensively represent the evolution of this industry across regions (Table 1) . We acknowledge that there may have been some exits prior to 2005 which would not necessarily have been captured by our methodology.
Patent data also was used as a measure of the level of integration of biotechnology and nanotechnology capabilities within a firm. We gathered all biotechnology and all nanotechnology US patents issued to the firms in our sample and identified patents overlapping both searches. As of 2011, 82 firms out of the 507 nanobiotechnology firms in our global sample had issued US patents which integrated biotechnology capabilities with nanotechnology capabilities. The level of nanobiotechnology integration was higher in de novo firms than in multinational corporations. By treating all firms as fundamental experiments in the evolution of an emerging industry and by attempting to capture all firms in the industry over time, our study adds to existing industry evolution literature by studying a case of technology confluence as it unfolds. Our advancement in granularity includes tracking firm entry and exit, firm type, and application focus. Using data from company documents, industry reports and the DMS and Medtrack databases, we are able to classify the biotechnology firms as belonging to specific sub-sectors which helps us to examine the evolution of nanobiotechnology at the level of the sub-sector.
Previous studies have concentrated on bibliometric assessments of scientific publications or patents to separately examine the biotechnology and nanotechnology industries 4 , or to examine specific case studies within the nanobiotechnology industry regarding the generation of interdisciplinary knowledge 5 . Patents, while critical to the study of invention, do not adequately represent innovation. One study which did examine firms commercializing nanomedicine identified 207 firms globally as of 2004: the study focused on new products which had been enabled by micro-and nanotechnology 6 . A later study identified 308 medical nanotechnology firms as of 2007 7 .
We extend existing studies in several ways. First, we focus on tracking the entry of firms into the emerging nanobiotechnology industry, and are very comprehensive in our identification of global nanobiotechnology firms, resulting in a broader geographical distribution than found in previous studies. Second, we also are more specific to nanotechnology by limiting our inclusion criteria to firms with nanoscale capabilities defined as less than 300 nm, as opposed to the 1000 nm criteria utilised by the earlier studies 6, 7 . Third, we include nanobiotechnology firms which do not yet have issued patents, where there is other public evidence of both biotechnology and nanotechnology capabilities. Fourth, by adopting keywords used to search broadly for nanotechnology patents 1,2 , while also tracking all firm biotechnology patents, we are able to enhance our industry evolution analysis and also provide insight on integration of biotechnology and nanotechnology capabilities. Together, this approach enables us to contribute to a nuanced, comprehensive picture of the emergence and evolution of the global nanobiotechnology industry.
